Introduction
Throughout the last decades various European countries have witnessed an increase in the electoral support for populist parties. There has been substantial scholarly attention for the performance of these parties, mostly focusing on radical right-wing variants in Western Europe. The role of these parties themselves in shaping their electoral fortune has been somewhat understudied, however. This article does consider the populist parties' agency as one of the vital factors in explaining for the electoral performance of populist parties. Other crucial variables it indentifies are the availability of the electorate and the responsiveness of established parties. The importance of these explanatory conditions is illustrated by means of a study of populist parties in the Netherlands. This article claims that a combination of explanatory conditions is crucial in understanding populist electoral fortune and hardship. Accordingly, this contribution will argue that the electoral success of the Dutch populist parties has been facilitated by the availability of the Dutch electorate, which became increasingly detached from traditional political parties. To understand the actual breakthrough of populist parties and their subsequent success or failure to survive, however, the agency of political actors must be considered. This relates, in the first place, to the responsiveness of established political parties. As will be shown, by the turn of the 21 st century neither of the mainstream parties sufficiently responded to the electorate's concerns related to immigration and cultural integration of, most notably, the Muslim minority population. This provided a favourable opportunity structure for the Dutch populist anti-establishment parties that focused on these issues. Secondly, as noted above, the credibility of the populist parties themselves has proven to be crucial to their breakthrough and electoral persistence. This relates to the skill of the populist party leadership and the ability to build up a sound party organisation after the initial breakthrough.
The following section touches on the concept of populism and the way populist parties are defined in this contribution. The subsequent section introduces the theoretical framework. Afterwards, the Dutch political background, the electoral developments and the characteristics of the most notable populist parties -the List Pim Fortuyn and the Freedom Party -are discussed. The remainder of the article focuses on explaining the electoral performance of populist parties in the Netherlands.
Populist parties
The concept of 'populism' is ambiguous due to the fact that it is often ill-defined and used in a haphazard fashion (see Taggart & Van Kessel, 2009; Van Kessel et al., 2008) .
Although it goes beyond the scope of this contribution to do the conceptual debate justice, it is necessary to provide a definition of populism in order to clarify the selection of populist cases in this article. Political parties are here classified as populist parties if they (1) delineate an exclusive community of 'ordinary people', (2) appeal to these 'ordinary' people, whose interests and opinions should be central in making political decisions, (3) are fundamentally hostile towards the (political) establishment, which allegedly does not act in the interest of the ordinary people (see e.g. Canovan, 1981; Taggart, 2000; Mudde, 2004; Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008) .
Populist parties thus position the 'ordinary people' and 'the establishment' in an antagonistic relationship. It is obviously not self-evident who belongs to these 'ordinary people' and populists are often not very specific about their core target audience.
Instead, this community of 'ordinary people', the populist 'heartland' in the words of Paul Taggart (2000) , is often rhetorically constructed in a negative manner. Populists normally identify those people that do not belong to the community (see Mudde, 2007; Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008) . Immigrants and minority groups are usual suspects, although populists are not necessarily xenophobic. The group of 'others' could, for instance, also consist of corporate elites, the media or intelligentsia whose ideas, values and interests are at odds with those of the ordinary people.
Populists are in any case opposed to the political powers that be. Residing in their ivory towers, the members of the political establishment lost track of the everyday problems of the people. The critique of populist parties goes further than condemning a particular political party or government -all (opposition) parties do that from time to time. Populists criticise the whole established political system and those parties that are seen to be part of it. A new way of decision-making is required, one that is straightforward, transparent and effectively copes with the people's problems.
A final note is that populist parties do not necessarily intend to get their following directly involved in politics. Instead, the populist party or, more specifically, the populist leader claims to speak in the name of the people; the populist knows what the ordinary people want and truly represents their interests.
On the basis of this definition, the populist parties in the Netherlands will be identified. This article particularly focuses on the List Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders'
Freedom Party, the populist parties that made most of an impact. In the analysis dealing with the electoral performance of populist parties, however, also the less successful populists will be discussed. The next section firstly outlines the theoretical framework for this analysis.
Explaining the electoral performance of populist parties
The central question in this contribution is how the electoral performance of populist parties can be explained. Various studies have tried to account for the performance of non-mainstream 'challenger' parties, especially extreme/radical right or anti-immigrant parties (e.g. Kitschelt & McGann, 1995; Lubbers et al., 2002; Carter, 2005; Van der Brug et al., 2005; Norris, 2005) . Several other accounts deal with the performance of populist parties (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008) and populist radical-right parties in particular (Betz, 1994; Rydgren, 2004; Mudde, 2007; Bornschier, 2010 ) Amir Abedi (2004 broadened the scope by studying the performance of 'Anti-Political Establishment' parties more generally. These studies regularly focus on structural factors, like economic conditions, the electoral system and other institutional rules, but do not always yield similar results (see e.g. Jackman & Volpert, 1996; Carter, 2005; Arzheimer & Carter, 2006) . Also the ideological placement of mainstream parties and their rivals and the convergence of mainstream parties have been taken into consideration in order to account for new non-mainstream party performance.
This study cannot truly take institutional factors into account, as it focuses on a single country. Besides, in view of the varying performance of populist parties in the Netherlands throughout the years, the marked proportionality of the Dutch electoral system is certainly not a sufficient condition for populist electoral success. Also economic conditions, as will be shown below, did not account for the breakthrough of populist parties at the beginning of the 21 st century. Finally, instead of measuring party distances in a one-or multi-dimensional ideological space, this article focuses on the responsiveness of established parties with regard to specific societal issues. Determining party positions or assessing the distance between parties mainly relates to the political supply-side. This study starts off from the notion that the responsiveness of established parties to the voters' demands -relating to both demand-and supply-side -plays a more crucial role in explaining populist electoral performance.
A more structural factor to be considered firstly, however, is the availability of the electorate (see Bartolini & Mair, 1990; Bartolini, 1999) . This relates to the voters' ties with established parties; is the electorate marked by strong partisan commitments or are many voters 'available' to be swayed by newly established parties? Abedi (2010) indeed finds that weak party partisan attachment is conducive to the success of anti-political establishment parties.
The two other factors this study distinguishes are related to the agency of political parties. Firstly, as mentioned, the responsiveness of established political parties is likely to play a significant role (Hauss & Rayside, 1978: 38) . If established parties do not recognise the salience of particular issues within society or if they fail to represent a dominant position with regard to those, they are potentially vulnerable to the rise of new challengers. Especially populist parties, which fundamentally criticise the political establishment, are likely to thrive when established political parties are perceived to be unresponsive to the demands of the 'ordinary citizens'. Apart from more substantive policy-related motivations, a vote for a populist party typically is an expression of dissatisfaction with the political establishment (see Bélanger & Aarts, 2006) . Existing parties, however, may hamper the development of populist parties by successfully seizing the ownership of the issues addressed by the populists (see Bale, 2003; Meguid, 2008) .
Finally, even if the breeding ground for populism is present, there would be no populist success without the supply of a credible populist political party. The importance of party organisation and leadership for explaining new (populist) party success has been acknowledged (e.g. Betz 1998: 9; Albertazzi & McDonnell 2008) . As Cas Mudde (2007: 275) notes with regard to the populist radical right, only few theoretical frameworks, however, take into account the agency of these parties themselves. In her comparative analysis dealing with Western European extreme right parties Elisabeth Carter (2005) does consider these parties' agency. She finds that especially the strength of the party organisation and the skill of the party leadership are important in terms of these parties' electoral performance (see also Lubbers et al., 2002) . This is very likely to apply to populist parties as well; populist parties have to present themselves as viable alternatives to the established parties in order to become successful. Particularly with regard to populist parties, the appearance of the party leader plays a crucial role.
Populist parties tend to be hierarchical organisations, spearheaded by a dominant and strong leader.
Measuring the credibility of populist parties is not an easy task, however. A qualitative assessment seems the best way to proceed when dealing with this variable.
Another challenge is not to fall in a tautology trap; it is easy enough to ascertain that successful populist parties must have presented themselves as credible challengers.
Therefore, it is necessary to look at indictors of credibility before the elections actually took place.
In terms of party leadership skills, this account assesses whether the populist parties have managed to attract sufficient media attention and whether the party (leader) made a strong impression during the election campaign. Also the credibility of the populist anti-establishment message is considered. It can be difficult for populist parties to convincingly stick to their anti-establishment appeal once they take place in government, as they have to become part of the system they previously vehemently opposed (Taggart, 2000) .
In line with Mudde's (2007: 275-6 ) assertion, leadership seems particularly important with regard to the breakthrough of populist parties, whereas the electoral persistence of the parties relies very much on their party organisation. After their breakthrough, populist parties are likely to lose their credibility if they fail to preserve internal discipline and cohesion (Norris 2005: 263) . As mentioned above, since populist parties are generally leader-centred organisations, they are especially likely to fall apart when the leader departs or loses grip on the party. The lack of a developed grass-root organisation, supplying fitting and reliable personnel for political office, is also conducive to internal instability.
This article thus identifies three factors which are deemed crucial to explain the electoral performance of populist parties: availability of the electorate, responsiveness of the established parties and the availability of credible populist parties. Arguably, similar variables can be identified to study the electoral performance of new 'challenger' parties more generally. This account, however, focuses on the elements relevant to populist parties in particular, such as the leader-centeredness and the populist anti-establishment appeal.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the causal conditions outlined above are not entirely unrelated. A lack of established parties' responsiveness, for instance, may increase the availability of an electorate which has become disillusioned with its political elite. For analytical purposes, however, it makes sense to separate the variables.
Moreover, whereas many scholars focus on individual variables in explaining the electoral success of (populist) political parties, this paper argues that it is the combination of explanatory conditions that is crucial in understanding populist electoral fortune.
Independence of the variables outlined here is thus not so much a vital matter.
Populist parties in the Netherlands
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During the 20 th century populist parties have sporadically appeared in the Dutch party system, although they never became successful for an extended period of time. The
Farmer's Party (Boerenpartij) broke through in the 1960s, but would never receive more than 4.8% of the vote. Also the ethno-nationalist xenophobic parties led by Hans Janmaat in the 1980s and 1990s (the Centre Party and Centre Democrats), could only count on limited and short-lived electoral success. Another populist party that emerged was the left-wing Socialist Party (SP). In the 1990s the party with Maoist roots could be described as a 'social-populist' party (March & Mudde, 2005) . However, in more recent years the party got, to a considerable degree, rid of its populist rhetoric and turned into a more conventional social-democratic party (De Lange & Rooduijn, 2011; Voerman & Lucardie, 2007) . This process had started before the general election of 2002, when the party grew and collected just under 6% of the vote, and was more or less completed when the SP reached its high point in 2006 with over 16% of the vote. The party's real breakthrough was thus not so much driven by its populism.
It was only after the turn of the 21 st century that a whole array of populist parties appeared on the Dutch political scene. Therefore, although the credibility of the SP and Janmaat's parties will be discussed later, this contribution predominantly focuses on the electoral performances of populist parties since the rise of Pim Fortuyn.
The rise and fall of the List Pim Fortuyn
The recent According to the criteria outlined above, the List Pim Fortuyn was a populist party.
Fortuyn appealed to the 'ordinary people', although he did not always explicitly describe his projected following as such. Still, his populist appeal can be noted in his book annex political programme 'The shambles of eight years Purple': "The Netherlands should become a real lively democracy of and for the ordinary people, and depart from the elite party democracy we are currently acquainted with" (Fortuyn, 2002, pp. 186) . What is more, according to Fortuyn, power would have to be returned to the 'people in the country' (Lucardie, 2008) ; the number of managers and bureaucrats had to be reduced and responsibility would have to be returned to the 'real' experts: the nurses, teachers and police officers (LPF, 2002) . Besides, as is clear from the examples above, Fortuyn expressed harsh critique on the political establishment, the incumbent 'Purple' government in particular. In the official election manifesto it is argued that 'Purple' has left the Netherlands with a rigid and self-satisfied political culture of appointed executives lacking creative or learning capacities (LPF, 2002, pp. 1).
Apart from the party's populist features, the LPF's more substantive political programme was rather eclectic (Lucardie, 2008) ; Fortuyn generally promoted a freemarket economy, tough measures with regard to law and order issues and stressed the need to cut red tape in the healthcare and education sectors. At the same time, however, his position on moral or cultural issues like drugs and traditional marriage was very
liberal.
Yet it was in his stance on immigration and integration that Fortuyn attracted most controversy. According to the LPF manifesto, crowdedness in The Netherlands caused growing societal tensions and it was therefore necessary to resist immigration of more, often unemployed and unskilled, foreigners into the country (LPF, 2002, pp. 5).
The programme also speaks of problems caused by the social-cultural backwardness of large groups in society and related problems like criminality and discrimination of women, especially in fundamentalist Islamic circles. Fortuyn sought to protect the Dutch liberal way of life against foreign cultural influences that clashed with the Dutch or, more broadly, Western liberal Enlightenment values (Akkerman, 2005 In terms of populism, Wilders appeals to the 'ordinary people' even more explicitly and criticises the established political elite more harshly than Fortuyn used to do. Wilders (2005, pp . 1) speaks of a "range of interlinked crises which flow from the incompetence of the political elite in Brussels and The Hague". In his 'declaration of independence ' Wilders (2005, pp. 2) further states: "I do not want this country to be hijacked by an elite of cowardly and frightened people (from whichever party) any longer. (…) Therefore, I intend to challenge this elite on all fronts. I want to return this country to its citizens". Wilders despises the self-sustaining political system which stands isolated from society; "politicians should no longer be deaf to the problems troubling ordinary people in every-day life" (Wilders, 2005, pp. 16 ).
In terms of substantive policies, Wilders' initial appeal was similar to Fortuyn's, but more radical as regards immigration and integration. Islam is perceived as a violent 'ideology' and Dutch culture should be protected against the process of 'Islamisation' (Vossen 2010) . The manifesto of 2010 nevertheless argues that the PVV is not a oneissue party, as Islamisation touches on a range of other social issues: "Economically it is a disaster, it damages the quality of our education, it increases insecurity on the streets, causes an exodus out of our cities, drives out Jewish and gay people, and flushes the century-long emancipation of women down the toilet" (PVV, 2010, pp. 6). The increased availability of the Dutch electorate had serious consequences for the fortunes of small and newly formed parties. These previously used to remain marginal in terms of size and influence, if they managed to enter the Dutch parliament at all (Krouwel & Lucardie, 2008; Van Kessel & Krouwel, 2011) . These consequences were particularly serious in view of the highly proportional Dutch electoral system which has, in theory, always been very open to new political parties (Mair, 2008) .
In order to account for the electoral performance of populist parties, however, also the agency of political parties has to be considered.
Responsiveness of the established parties
Before the rise of Fortuyn, some scholars already predicted the potential for populist parties in The Netherlands. Rudy Andeweg (2001, pp. 123) , for instance, argued that the Dutch consensus democracy would provide fertile grounds for critique from the populist right, as consensus democracies are "strong on inclusiveness and weak on accountability". Also Jacques Thomassen (2000) predicted that there was potential for the populist radical right, although he related it more specifically to the convergence of the mainstream parties towards the political centre.
The findings of Pennings and Keman (2003) , based on data from the Comparative Manifestos Project, indeed confirm that the mainstream parties in the Netherlands have converged. The authors also see this as one of the main factors behind Fortuyn's success. The public was not able to distinguish between mainstream parties anymore, and Fortuyn was able to occupy the political space that has become vacant. Be that as it may, the fact that the mainstream parties did not press certain issues or the fact that party programmes have converged throughout time does not necessarily mean that parties have also been unresponsive. Perhaps the issue of multiculturalism was not perceived to be very important by the Dutch electorate. This, however, was certainly not the case. As Pellikaan, De Lange and Van der Meer (2003; 2007) argue, the established parties failed to recognise that citizens actually were concerned about the perceived problems of immigration and the 'multicultural' character of society. Fortuyn managed to introduce a new 'cultural' line of political conflict which "had been ignored by the political elite, but was highly salient to the electorate" (Pellikaan et al., 2007, pp. 294 ).
On the basis of Dutch Parliamentary Election studies Kees Aarts and Jacques Thomassen (2008, pp. 217) indeed find that since the early 1990s the electorate saw problems related to minorities and refugees very important societal issues. As figure 3 indicates, these issues suddenly became more important for many voters at the turn of has to be considered.
Supply of credible populist parties
Even if the breeding ground for populism has been present in the Netherlands, there would have been no populist success without the supply of a credible populist political party; a party marked by skilful leadership and a decent party organisation (Carter, 2005) . Pim Fortuyn's popularity, and the success of populist leaders in general, is often related to personal 'charisma' (e.g. Ellemers, 2004) . However, this 'charisma hypothesis', based on the notion that a vote for a populist party is largely motivated by the extraordinary endowments of the populist leader alone, has been rightly criticised (Van der Brug, 2003; Van der Brug & Mughan, 2007) . Indeed, as has been shown above, people voting for populist parties seem to be motivated by substantive concerns, just like supporters of any other parties. This is not to say that party leaders, especially of populist parties, do not play an Fortuyn that really mattered; most Liveable supporters followed him to his new party.
In the pre-Fortuyn era populist parties could not rely on such an extraordinary figurehead. The populist anti-immigrant Centre Party and Centre Democrats, led by the late Hans Janmaat, only had some very limited success in the 1980s and 1990s.
Between 1994 and 1998 the Centre Democrats reached their peak with 3 seats, before disappearing from parliament in 1998. Janmaat was hardly an appealing leader. Whilst being a confident speaker, he was "not really eloquent and often too emotional to convince anyone but his own supporters" (Lucardie, 1998: 116) . Besides, in terms of organisation, both Janmaat's parties were not free from internal disputes. Janmaat was actually expelled from the Centre Party in 1984 and founded the Centre Democrats afterwards. Finally, as figure 3 has shown, immigration only really became a salient issue in the 1990s. During most of this decade Liberal leader Bolkestein managed to effectively voice discontent as regards the, allegedly too liberal, Dutch migration policy (Lucardie, 1998: 122) . This is likely to have reduced the appeal of the Centre Democrats even further.
The Socialist Party, in turn, lacked sufficient nationwide visibility until the late 1990s ( Van der Steen, 1995; Voerman & Lucardie, 2007) . After the disappointing 1989 general election the party broadened the scope of its campaign efforts and the party became known for its telling campaign slogan 'Vote against, vote SP!' (Stem tegen, stem SP!). The Labour party, meanwhile, received criticism for the cuts in social benefits during its time in office. In 1994 the SP managed to win two seats and grew further in 1998, receiving five seats. Jan Marijnissen grew out to be an appealing, eloquent leader and the party remained well organised.
However, in order to appeal to a wider audience the party let go of its more radical policies and dropped references to its communist heritage (Voerman & Lucardie, 2007 . This compares to a figure of no less than 31.5% for LPF voting respondents (see figure 4) . 
Conclusions and implications
This contribution has sought to outline key causal conditions related to the electoral performance of populist parties, using the Netherlands as a case study. The case of the Netherlands can be seen as an ideal 'laboratory' case in view of the varying levels of success for Dutch populist parties in recent years. This article argued that the combination of three causal conditions has been crucial: the availability of the electorate, the responsiveness of established parties and the supply of credible populist parties.
As has been shown, the structures of party competition in the Netherlands have become highly favourable to the electoral success of populist parties. The electorate has become increasingly available after the demise of the pillarised cleavage structures, which meant that, in more recent years, new parties were fully able to profit from the highly proportional Dutch electoral system.
In addition, the agency of political parties played a crucial role. Political Finally, whereas the credibility of the List Pim Fortuyn was damaged due to continuous infighting and while other populist contenders lacked appeal, Geert Wilders managed to build up a united party organisation under his own firm leadership while sending out an appealing message to a large share of the Dutch voters. Whether he will manage to preserve cohesion and credibility in the future remains to be seen, however.
The Dutch case suggests that mainstream parties do not automatically win back the support they lost to the populists if they become more responsive. In the Netherlands, immigration and cultural integration are now important issues to most political parties, but this does not seem to hamper Geert Wilders' success. This suggests that if a populist party manages to retain its credibility, it can ward off competition from its mainstream rivals.
What is more, as the Freedom Party is not officially part of the government it remains to be seen whether a 'black-widow effect' will materialise (Bale 2003) . This happens when mainstream parties gobble up the electoral support of the radical junior coalition partner by copying its policies. The Freedom Party can, instead, claim credit for tougher immigration and integration measures, whilst blaming the government for less electorally appealing policies. The Danish People's party, which has incrementally extended its support during the past decade, serves as a good example.
Further research is required to assess the plausibility of the arguments outlined here. One of the main points this contribution has attempted to stress, in any case, is the importance of populist party agency. This factor should also be taken into account in comparative and quantitative studies on the electoral performance of such parties. Source: Van Holsteyn and Irwin (2003: 50) . Data: Budge et al (2001) , Klingemann et al (2006) . The multiculturalism references scale is computed as: multiculturalism (positive references) minus multiculturalism (negative references).
Note
Figure 3: Most important issues as perceived by the Dutch electorate
Source: Aarts and Thomassen (2008: 216) . (CBS et al 2007) .
